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INTRODUCTION
T his article examines causal factors behind large-scale employee downsizing in twodifferent settings, France and the UK, from 2008 to 2013. Our theoretically informedcomparative study contributes to important debates in two literature sets: those on
financialization and comparative institutionalism. Financialization refers to the
increased importance of financial considerations in the governance of companies, which
prioritizes the interests of investor-owners, which is shareholder value (van der Zwan,
2014). This greater prominence of finance is made possible by important structural
developments in the global economy, most notably removal of controls on capital
movements across borders and the growth in the financial assets of shareholder value
driven funds. These developments have resulted in unprecedented amounts of capital
chasing profitable investment opportunities (Engelen and Konings, 2010; see also
Krippner, 2005). At firm level, financialization highlights how the ascendancy of
shareholder value entails an important reorganization of resource allocation aimed at
keeping stock prices high and returning cash flows to shareholders. In the context of
investor and shareholder value, recourse to employee downsizing constitutes a popular
strategy used by companies to generate resources that are then distributed to
shareholders (Jacoby, 2005; Clark, 2013; Appelbaum and Batt, 2014).
Our second contribution is to the literature on comparative institutional analysis.
Institutional approaches constitute mid-range theory that aims to illustrate how conflict over
resources and strategic choices are mediated by the institutional setting in which they take
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place (Hall, 1986; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). Institutional arrangements matter because they
enable, and constrain, different firm-level actors (managers, shareholders andworkers) in their
competing claims over the allocation of resources and, more broadly, over the governance of
the firm (Whitley, 1999; Campbell, 2004). That is, institutions structure power relations inside
companies that, in turn, strengthen the ability of different actors to advance their interests
against others with different preferences (Hall, 1986; Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005; see also
Goergen et al., 2013 for downsizing). Incorporating institutional analyses into the study of
employment relations is insightful in order to account for the diffusion of financialization, a
highly redistributive phenomenon, across different countries.
Our argument, in respect of employee downsizing, centres on the necessity of situating
HR strategies within a corporate context that incorporates both the priorities of
financialization within firms and the importance of institutional diversity across national
business systems. To effectively address this challenge, we incorporate into our analysis
theoretical insights developed across the social sciences that highlight the importance of
complex causation in understanding outcomes, such as the implementation of large-scale
employee lay-offs (Ragin, 1987; Mahoney, 2004). From an ontological standpoint, our
argument illustrates how the implementation of employee downsizing across national
settings is not generated by the presence of one single cause applicable to all national
business systems. Rather, downsizing occurs as the result of configurations of specific
conditions that differ across national settings. The presence of institutional diversity, while
not constituting an obstacle to the diffusion of shareholder value practices as correctly
asserted by financialization approaches, provides revealing insights enabling us to assess
which sets of conditions will be necessary and/or sufficient to generate a similar outcome,
namely, employee downsizing, across institutionally different economies (Braumoeller,
2003; Goyer, 2011: 106–128).
The diffusion of financial considerations across national settings is shaped by the extent
to which institutional arrangements enable actors to implement, or resist, employee
downsizing. In the institutionally constrained context of the French economy, the presence
of several ‘conducive’ factors is required for large-scale lay-offs to take place. In the
institutionally permissive context of the UK economy, in contrast, the implementation of
employee downsizing schemes will be easier as reflected by the presence of less
demanding configurations of specific factors. Drawing from the literature on comparative
corporate governance (Roe, 2000; Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005; Atanassov and Kim, 2009;
Gospel and Pendleton, 2014), we develop our theoretical framework by examining the
impact of three firm-level financialized variables on the implementation of large-scale
downsizing schemes: financial leverage; categories of institutional investor; and
ownership structures of companies.
This article is structured as follows. The first part looks at two theoretical perspectives that
provide important contextual insights for the study of employee downsizing: financialization
and institutional approaches. Part two integrates financialization and institutional approaches
into our framework of complex causation. This integration leads to a complex and
comprehensive understanding of the increased prominence of financial considerations in the
governance of companies across different institutional settings. We also outline how
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as a research method best captures notions of
complex causation. Part three presents the foundations of the QCA methodology. Part four
reports on our data sample. Part five reveals our empirical findings and part six contains a
discussion and conclusion on our findings and the contribution of our research to theory
building.
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EMPLOYEE DOWNSIZING IN ADVANCED CAPITALIST ECONOMIES: COMPETING
THEORETICAL APPROACHES
Financialization constitutes an important theoretical perspective that provides key insights for
the investigation of employee downsizing, an increasingly prevalent phenomenon in
contemporary capitalism (Clark, 2009; Thompson, 2011). The prominence of financial
considerations in the governance of companies has beenmade possible by important structural
changes in the global economy: the liberalization of capital flows across borders and the
growth in the financial assets of shareholder value driven funds – especially those based
in the UK and in the US (Engelen and Konings, 2010). As a result, an unprecedented
amount of capital is moving across international financial markets in search for liquid
and profitable investment opportunities. At the firm level, financialization refers to the
ascendancy of shareholder value as the guiding star for firm strategy that prioritizes the
interests of shareholders at the expense of other actors in the corporation, most notably
employees, thereby resulting in a major redistribution of wealth (see also Gourevitch
and Shinn, 2005; Jacoby, 2005; van der Zwan, 2014). In liberal market economies, the
unbridled pursuit of shareholder value means that new financial objectives, for example,
high stock prices and maximizing the release of cash flows to shareholders, are being
pursued at the expense of other goals – and very often via the breach of implicit contracts
with employees (Appelbaum et al., 2013; Appelbaum and Batt, 2014).
The implementation of employee downsizing is central in this redistributive process.
Shareholder value driven objectives are often secured by the implementation of corporate
policies that allocate resources away from employees –most notably dividend payouts, a focus
on core competencies, share buybacks and the introduction of a financial performance matrix
such as return on equity (Kahan and Rock, 2007; Brav et al., 2008). Yet, the implementation of
employee downsizing schemes does not contribute to the innovative capabilities of the firm
as revenues generated from these lay-offs are not reinvested. The (potential) productivity gains
of ‘financialized’ firms are appropriated by shareholder value driven investors at the expense of
retained profit for further investment in innovation (Jacoby, 2005; Appelbaum and Batt, 2014;
Goergen et al., 2014). Therefore, as highlighted in this journal, incorporating financialization
as a new structural development into the analysis of employment relations is paramount given
the traditional focus of HRM approaches around concepts of high performance work systems
that neglect the increased influence of finance (Thompson, 2011: 361).
A conceptual challenge for the theorization of financialization, however, is to account for
the diffusion of this new business model across institutionally dissimilar business systems.
By (correctly) emphasizing structural developments as crucial factors in the prominence of
financial considerations, these approaches place less emphasis on the contingent character
of their introduction in specific contexts. Because of its heavily redistributive character, the
diffusion of financialization across countries is not a neutral process but one characterized
by conflict where intricacies therein remain to be investigated (Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005;
Goyer, 2011). For instance, two studies on downsizing in non-liberal market economies,
Munoz-Bullon and Sanchez-Bueno (2014) on Spain and Ahmadjian and Robinson (2001)
on Japan, illustrate the importance of institutional isomorphic pressures that encourage
companies to implement employee downsizing whenever other ‘leading’ firms adopt this
practice. That is, the introduction of employee downsizing as a shareholder value practice
in these two economies raised issues of institutional legitimacy as companies felt
comfortable in implementing employee downsizing schemes only as followers. As recently
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noted, therefore, an important challenge is to understand how the increased prominence of
financialization translates into workplace outcomes across different business systems
(Thompson and Cushen, 2015).
A second theoretical perspective for the study of employee downsizing is the literature on
comparative institutional analysis. Institutional approaches are conceptualized as mid-level
variables, as distinct from macro-structures, that act as mid-range theory (Hall, 1986; Thelen
and Steinmo, 1992). Institutionally based scholars do not advance the notion that only
institutions matter for outcomes. Rather institutional analyses aim to account for how conflict
over resources, and strategic choices by actors aremediated by the institutional setting inwhich
they take place (Whitley, 1999; Campbell 2004). Institutional analyses are also often built
around a specific research design, namely, how the presence of institutional differences account
for observed variations in an outcome variable of interest (Dobbin, 1994). From a
methodological perspective, therefore, institutional approaches aim to explain variations
within a class of phenomenon based on the presence of institutional differences that, in turn,
makes it difficult to conceptualize how and why exogenous structural developments occur
(Krippner, 2005).
Institutional approaches are, however, better suited to explain the diffusion of
financialization across national settings. The redistributive character of the financialization
process serves as a reminder that the corporation remains a contested entity with different
actors making divergent claims regarding its governance (Whitley, 1999; Campbell, 2004). In
this context, the transposition of the preferences of actors into outcomes, and their ability to
defend their interests against other actors with opposing preferences, constitutes a process that
is shaped by institutional arrangements that structure power relations (Hall, 1986; Dobbin,
1994). For instance, a decision to introduce employee downsizing schemes might take place
at the firm level but does not occur in an institutional vacuum. Institutional arrangements
characterized by strong employment protection enable workers to better defend their interests,
most notably by limiting themanagerial prerogative to adjust employment levels via strategies
of external flexibility (Goergen et al., 2013; OECD, 2013). The institutions governing job security
shape managerial ability to determine who is recruited and laid off. In turn, institutional
constraints placed on the managerial prerogative to use labour reduce their ability to
redistribute resources to shareholders (Roe, 2000). As a result, differences in institutional
arrangements across national settings provide employees with diverging capabilities to
moderate the impact of structural changes in the global economy against other actors, most
notably shareholders, with different preferences regarding the governance of the corporation.
The case selection of France and the UK is well suited for integrating the insights of
financialization and institutional approaches. In terms of research design, these two countries
constitute most dissimilar systems as they sit at opposite ends of the European institutional
spectrum regarding employment protection. The UK is characterized by institutional
arrangements that place few restrictions on the managerial prerogative to dismiss employees.
Compared with other European countries, the UK maintains only weak employment
protection as measured by the costs of hiring new employees, size of severance payments,
notice period for the initiation of collective dismissal procedures and the legal recourse of
employees against collective dismissals (Goergen et al., 2013; OECD, 2013). The heightened
managerial ability to reorganize the workplace is further supported by now embedded
Thatcher era and successive pieces of legislation that have reduced trade union power by
imposing secret ballots to support industrial action, placed restrictions on secondary picketing
and strongly diluted the constraining character of pre-job and post-job entry agreements for
union membership (Howell, 2005; Davies and Freedland, 2007).
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France, in contrast, is characterized by restrictive institutional arrangements over the
regulation of job security for both open-ended contracts and atypical employment.
Employment protection for open-ended contracts is comparatively strong by European
standards when strength is measured by the size of severance payments, notice period for
the initiation of collective dismissal procedures and the legal recourse available to employees
in cases of collective dismissal (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2006; OECD, 2013). The
French economy also exhibits extremely strict regulatory enforcement in the area of atypical
employment, namely, fixed-term contracts and part-time jobs (Venn, 2009). The use of
part-time contracts and fixed-term contracts is limited to specific situations, mainly the
replacement of an employee who is absent and for unexpected increases in activities.
The selection of France and the UK provide informative settings to investigate the insights
associated with integrating financialization and institutional approaches – the former focusing
on the emergence of structural changes in the global economy that heightened financial
considerations in the governance of the firm; the latter illuminating how these new pressures
spread across national settings. The expectation of financialization approaches is that the use
of employee downsizing will be prominent in the governance of French and UK companies,
that is, two institutionally dissimilar business systems. From the perspective of institutional
approaches, by contrast, the diffusion of financial considerations in the form of employee
downsizing, a highly redistributive process, is likely to be more contested in France than in
the UK given the presence of institutional differences in the use of lay-offs (Gourevitch and
Shinn, 2005; Goergen et al., 2013).
THEORY AND PROPOSITIONS: A QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYEE
DOWNSIZING IN FRANCE AND THE UK
Our investigation focuses on the causal factors of large-scale lay-offs in France and the UK
between 2008 and 2013. From an ontological standpoint, our argument is embedded in the
literature on complex causation whereby important events are not generated by the presence
of one cause alone, but occur as the result of different configurations of specific conditions
(Ragin, 1987; Hall, 2003; Thelen and Mahoney, 2015). Sensitivity to complex and historical
specificities is unlikely to be achieved by explanations that seek to identify the direct effects
of a particular independent variable across dissimilar contexts (Mahoney, 2004). Stand-alone
explanations invariably fail to capture processes of causal complexity – especially in the context
of diffusion across different business systems (Hall, 2003).
Our investigation is based on the use of the QCA, the technique developed by Ragin (2000)
to capture instances of causal complexity. 1 Built on the logic of Boolean algebra, a key strength
of QCA is its combination of the strengths of both case-oriented research and quantitative
research to capture how economic and social outcomes are generated by a configuration of
factors, that is, complex causation (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). The analysis of causal
complexity via the QCA method differs from statistical techniques as the impact of
hypothesized independent variables on the dependent variable is not additive, but rather
cumulative and interdependent (Ragin, 1987; Mahoney, 2004). The QCA technique captures
two forms of causal complexity: conjunctural causation and equifinality.
Conjunctural causation refers to how interactions among different factors generate a
specific outcome that would not occur without the presence of all of these interacting
factors (x1 + x2 +…xN→ y). In other words, individual hypothesized independent
variables are necessary but not sufficient to produce a specific outcome (Ragin, 2000;
Mahoney, 2004). Necessary but not sufficient conditions for downsizing illustrate that
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some specific outcomes are relatively more difficult to achieve because the occurrence of
the value of interest on the dependent variable is contingent upon the presence of all
hypothesized independent variables (Hall, 2003).
Equifinality, in contrast, captures the presence of different but functionally equivalent,
and thus non-competing paths that secure a similar outcome (x1 or x2 or … xN→ y)
(Ragin, 1987; Mahoney, 2004). In other words, hypothesized independent variables are
sufficient but not necessary to produce a specific outcome. Sufficient but not necessary
conditions for downsizing illustrate that some specific outcomes are relatively easier to
achieve given the presence of several alternative paths to the occurrence of a similar
outcome (Braumoeller, 2003). Functionally equivalent paths reflect the presence of a
greater range of possible courses of actions by which shareholder value practices spread
across business systems.
The use of complexity provides a comprehensive understanding of important
phenomenon in social sciences. Theoretically, our application of complex causation allows
us to illustrate how institutional arrangements shape the diffusion of financialization
considerations across national business systems. Social science research increasingly relies
on the notion of causal complexity to explain important outcomes but invariably fails to
conceptualize the specific types of complexity required to generate a specific outcome in
terms of the uneven distribution of necessary/sufficient conditions across settings
(Mahoney, 2008). By building on this observation, we argue that settings characterized
by extensive institutional constraints, such as those in France, will require the presence
of a greater number of ‘supporting’ factors for downsizing to occur. The incorporation of
financial considerations in the governance of French companies is characterized by the
presence of conjunctural causation whereby several factors interact together in order to
overcome institutional barriers and by the presence of a highly limited number, and
constraining, set of scenarios of substitutability, thereby illustrating that employee
downsizing is difficult to implement in France. In settings characterized by institutional
permissiveness, such as the UK, our expectation is that the implementation of employee
downsizing will result from significantly less demanding sets of factors. Therefore, our
argument emphasizes how the presence of institutional diversity in employment
protection in France and the UK points to different types of managerial challenge when
financial considerations, such as the implementation of large-scale lay-offs, are introduced
into the strategic governance of companies. That is, different types of complex causation
(necessary/sufficient conditions) will be needed to generate employee downsizing across
institutionally dissimilar national business systems.
We develop our conceptual framework empirically by testing the causal effect of three
financialized variables from the literature on comparative corporate governance that are central
to employee downsizing: financial leverage; categories of investors; and ownership structures
of companies (Roe, 2000; Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005; Brav et al., 2008; Atanassov and Kim,
2009; Gospel and Pendleton, 2014).
Debt/financial leverage
An important variable in empirical studies of employee downsizing is leverage (Cascio,
1993; Datta et al., 2010). While the level of debt is not necessarily an indicator of poor
performance, it does raise two issues with implications for the undertaking of employee
downsizing across national business systems. The first one relates to the governance of
the firm. High indebtedness could lead to a loss of control to creditors and/or increase
the risks of bankruptcy (Bruslerie and Latrous, 2012). As a result, high debt generates
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strong incentives for corporate insiders, controlling shareholders and managers alike, to
confront employees in order to extract concessions for avoiding the occurrence of these
two scenarios (Bronars and Deere, 1991). In situations of high indebtedness, the
bargaining power of employees might be reduced. Empirical studies across a range of
institutionally dissimilar national business systems, characterized by varying regulations
of employment termination, have documented that the implementation of large-scale lay-
offs is undertaken by companies with more extensive debt loads as compared with other
domestic firms (Atanassov and Kim, 2009). In particular, strong employment protection is
less effective in preventing large-scale lay-offs in situations of high leverage (Atanassov
and Kim, 2009).
The second issue associated with debt is the changed funding strategy of banks in many
advanced capitalist economies, including France and the UK, that, in turn, impact on their
ability to provide debt finance and roll over existing debt (Hardie et al., 2013). An important,
and traditional, function of banks is to serve an intermediary between household savers and
non-financial corporations, which is to issue loans that are financed by relatively stable
customer deposits. As a result of a series of changes that took place since the mid/late 1990s,
by contrast, commercial banks have developed new series of business activities that involves
repacking pools of loans into tradable instruments, that is, securitization. Moreover, these
new banking activities are no longer exclusively financed by customer deposits, but entails
recourse to borrowing from investors and other banks. Thus, banks increasingly faced a
funding gap whereby customer deposits do not cover their lending activities. Prior to
the advent of the 2008 financial crisis, the funding gap of commercial banks in France and
the UK was significantly important, the two highest among the G5 countries, and exceed the
10-per cent figure (Hardie et al., 2013). 2 Moreover, this funding gap was financed by relatively
short-term sources from wholesale markets: French banks covered their funding gap via issue
of short-term debt securities (Howarth, 2013) while UK banks exhibited strong reliance on
borrowing from short-term driven inter-bank and commercial paper markets (Hardie et al.,
2013). The fragility of the funding activities of banks, in turn, has led to a severe tightening of
their lending activities between 2008 and 2013 because of the cost and availability of funding,
that is, the credit crunch, as large commercial banks in the two countries scrambled to lower
their reliance on external sources of funding (The Economist, 2013; Hardie et al., 2013: 9).
Non-financial companies with high leverage might face difficulties to refinance themselves
given the financing constraints faced by commercial banks.
We investigate the impact of leverage on the undertaking of employee downsizing in France
and the UK in the overall context of the credit crunch, while their respective regulation of
employment dismissals is still characterized by significant institutional differences. Greater
financial leverage enhances the bargaining position of management because the credible threat
of bankruptcy or significant plant closures makes it easier to extract concessions from
employees. This is likely to be an important factor in France given the presence of extensive
institutional constraints that make it difficult to implement employee downsizing as an
offensive strategic tool aimed at enhancing shareholder value. Thus, our expectation is that
high financial leverage will constitute a necessary condition for the introduction of employee
downsizing programmes in France (Proposition 1).
By contrast, the UK exhibits comparatively weak employment protection where the
governance of companies is shaped by the presence of institutional arrangements that heighten
managerial ability to introduce downsizing in both favourable and adverse macroeconomic
conditions (OECD, 2013). Thus, our expectation is that high financial leverage/debt, which
increases the bargaining power of management vis-à-vis their employees, will not be needed
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and, therefore, will not constitute a necessary condition for the introduction of employee
downsizing programmes in the UK (Proposition 2).
Categories of investors and employee downsizing
Financialized investors are important actors in contemporary capitalism, which bring with
them negative consequences for employment stability (Jacoby, 2005; van der Zwan, 2014:
114–119). However, employee downsizing cannot be simply captured by the rise in practices
emblematic of shareholder value in the strategic governance of the firm; it is, rather, contingent
on specific categories of investors. Different categories of shareholder value driven investors –
hedge funds, private equity, mutual funds, pension funds and sovereign wealth funds –
constitute sub-groups with different incentives. In turn, these sub-groups are governed by
particular internally defined rules – that impact differentially on employment relations (Gospel
and Pendleton, 2014: 1–26).
Financialized investors – hedge funds and private equity funds – constitute the most
disruptive categories of investors for employment relations. Because of internal rules on
trading and managerial remuneration schemes, these investors are driven by performance
goals, not by diversification concerns, as fund managers are incentivized to secure the
maximum possible absolute returns, not just achieve targeted mandated minimum returns
(Goyer, 2006). Fund manager compensation derives from the amount of assets under
management (1–2 per cent) and, to a substantial extent, from incentive fees (usually 20 per cent
of profits) once a defined hurdle rate of return has been achieved. These more aggressive
investor-owners are also characterized by short-term horizons, especially hedge funds, as
highlighted by their higher turnover rates of equity holding, and are more likely to target
undervalued foreign companies whose market capitalization may increase following the
implementation of corporate restructuring policies (Brav et al., 2008). For these investors,
shareholder activism is ex ante; they select companies on the basis that their involvement as
equity owners will trigger changes in corporate policies (Kahan and Rock, 2007).
Mutual funds, on the other hand, constitute an intermediary category of investor-owner
whose economic incentives are very similar to those of ‘aggressive’ hedge funds but whose
mode of shareholder activism, if occurring at all, is ex post (Brav et al., 2008). Mutual fund
managers are encouraged to surpass financial benchmarks (relative performance) as a result
of variable pay incentives and greater liquidity concerns from savers whose investments are
redeemable at any time. Finally, pension funds and sovereign wealth funds constitute long-
term investor-owners with low turnover rates of portfolio stocks, and whose investment
strategies and mode of governance are the least disruptive to employment relations (Goyer,
2011: 51–70). Their long-term investment strategy results in risk diversification through
investment in a large number of companies – although pension funds are outsourcing part of
themanagement of their assets tomore active investors.Moreover, financial incentives for fund
managers are less imperative indicating that the size of the pool is limited by the current cohort
of retirees.
In summary, investment funds exhibit variations in incentive sets for fund manager
remuneration, length of investment horizons and the extent to which the investment strategy
is driven by performance concerns versus risk diversification. Our expectation is that the
presence of pension funds and sovereign wealth funds, that is, investment funds, which
themselves are less financialized, will not constitute either a necessary or a sufficient condition
in both France and the UK for the implementation of lay-off schemes (Proposition 3). The mere
presence of hedge funds and private equity investors, on the other hand, is insufficient to
accurately predict outcomes across business systems. In France, aggressive rentier investor-
Michel Goyer, Ian Clark and Shabneez Bhankaraully
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, VOL 26, NO 3, 2016 259
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
owners face significant institutional constraints regarding their ability to secure the
implementation of large-scale downsizing. Our expectation is that the sole presence of hedge
funds, mutual funds and private equity investors will not constitute a sufficient condition in
itself for the introduction of employee downsizing programmes in the institutionally
constraining context of France (Proposition 4).
Ownership structure of companies
The ownership structure of listed companies has been identified as a central variable in the
literature on comparative corporate governance in relation to the ability of managers to meet
the demands of investors and implement shareholder value practices (Roe, 2000; Gourevitch
and Shinn, 2005). In liberal market economies, the ownership structure of listed companies is
dispersed with shares being widely distributed. Non-liberal market economies, by contrast,
are characterized by the presence of controlling shareholders with a large equity stake that
enable them to shape the strategic direction of the firm. Variations in ownership structures
matter for the implementation of shareholder value practices because the presence of a
concentrated equity owner substantially reduces the effectiveness of shareholder activism by
investors (Kahan and Rock, 2007; Brav et al., 2008). Put simply, institutional investors, who
acquire only 5–20 per cent of the equity stake of listed companies as minority shareholders,
can be outvoted by the large controlling owner.
Building on this literature, we investigate whether, and how, the presence of ownership
diffusion will be a favourable factor for the implementation of employee downsizing schemes.
The ability of hedge funds and private equity funds to promote and secure employee
downsizing could be significantly strengthened in the context of ownership diffusion because
there is no insider owner with a controlling equity stake that could outvote them. In the
presence of ownership concentration, in contrast, a large insider can always outvote aggressive
shareholder activism. In the institutionally permissive context of the UK, we expect the
presence of ownership diffusion to enable short-term investors to secure the implementation
of employee downsizing. Thus, our expectation is that employee downsizing in the UK will
not occur in the presence of ownership concentration (Proposition 5). In the French case, in
contrast, the joint presence of financialized investors and ownership diffusion will not
constitute a sufficient path by which employee downsizing occurs (Proposition 6). Leverage
still matters in France (Proposition 1).
METHODS
We adopt the fuzzy sets variant of QCA (fsQCA) because it enables our variables to be
captured through graded, but non-dichotomous, membership within a scale of 0 (full
nonmembership) to 1 (full membership) (Ragin, 2000; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012).
Dependent and independent variables are not always best measured in a dichotomous form,
but are characterized by differences both in degrees and kinds. Hedge funds and sovereign
wealth funds constitute categories of institutional investors that are located at each extreme
of the spectrum regarding the extent to which they are potentially disruptive to employment
relations but other categories of shareholders, such as mutual funds, are not. Therefore, it is
appropriate to code variables along a spectrum rather than in a dichotomous manner.
The use of the QCA set-theoretic method is associated with the coding of variables to the
(relative) extent towhich they fit into a ‘set’ or notwith a defined concept of interest – employee
downsizing in this article. This coding process is called calibration. In the earlier example, we
investigate the extent to which institutional investors have incorporated the priorities of
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financialization becausewe hypothesize that a heightened focus on shareholder value results in
higher recourse to employee downsizing. Therefore, hedge funds are calibrated with a fuzzy-
set membership of 1 compared with 0.8, 0.6, 0.3 and 0.2 for private equity funds, mutual funds,
pension funds and sovereign wealth funds, respectively (Table 1). This indicates that hedge
funds and mutual funds, for instance, are both in the set of shareholders who are strongly
driven by financialization concerns (a qualitative attribute), but hedge funds are more active
in pressuring portfolio firms to implement downsizing schemes as compared with mutual
funds (a quantitative difference). Sovereign wealth funds, on the other hand, are mostly out
of this set.
The fsQCA method relies on the use of breakpoints, that is, coding differences along a
spectrum, in the assignment of fuzzy sets membership to each single case variable (Table 1).
We used the ‘continuous’ fuzzy-set scale (Ragin, 2008) to calibrate all our variables (except
for leverage), based on the theoretical arguments described later. The three major breakpoints
along this scale range from being fully in the set (1), undefined as being in or out of the set (0.5)
and being fully out of the set (0). For leverage, we use the direct method of calibration, which is
a built-in function of the fsQCA software to calibrate interval-scale data (Ragin, 2008; Schneider
and Wagemann, 2012). Once the database sheet is uploaded onto the fsQCA software, and
leverage is calibrated, the software is used to process the data and generate the causal paths
for necessity and sufficiency. Consistency and coverage thresholds are then defined to assess
the significance of the results.
The calibration process operationalizes these variables into fuzzy-set membership scores
and is detailed in Table 1. First, all cases of workforce reductions are included in our database
for the sampled firms during the period under review. Substantial employee downsizing was
classified as workforce reductions of 5 per cent or more per annum, which is also in line with
previous studies (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005; Munoz-Bullon and Sanchez-Bueno, 2014).
Our calibration framework thus distinguishes between substantial downsizing cases (where
the outcome variable is coded as ‘1’) and other random reductions in the number of staff.
Second, leverage was operationalised as the average of total debts over total capital for our
two countries (Bessler et al., 2011). Single country coding of leverage is problematic given the
presence of differences in the importance of bank financing among countries (Atanassov and
Kim, 2009). Thus, we computed leverage by calculating the average of the total debt to total
capital percentages of all sampled companies (56 for France and 57 for the UK) for the period
under review divided by the number of years, that is, 6 years. Final leverage figures are
48 per cent for France and 40 per cent for the UK, hence an average of 44 per cent. The
qualitative breakpoints to code leverage using the direct method of calibration were defined
around the average for both countries: cases with leverage percentages of 44 per cent upwards
were assigned a fuzzy-set membership of 1, cases at half this percentage, that is, 22 per cent,
were assigned a fuzzy-setmembership value of 0.5while caseswith a leverage of 1 per centwere
completely out of the set with a membership of 0 (Table 1).
Third, the calibration for ownership structure was taken from Gourevitch and Shinn
(2005) and identifies specific thresholds for ownership diffusion (less than 5 per cent) and
the presence of an insider owner who can shape the strategy of the company (more than
20 per cent) (Table 1). Fourth, the calibration for investors is based on three criteria that
highlight the extent to which they have incorporated shareholder value concerns at the
expense of employee interests: financial incentives of fund managers, investment horizons
and trading turnover of funds, and the extent to which their investment strategy is driven
by performance concerns versus risk diversification (Kahan and Rock, 2007; Gospel and
Pendleton, 2014).
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DATA AND SAMPLES
Our sample comprises the largest stock market capitalization in each country, the SBF120 for
France and the FTSE 100 for theUK, as large firms aremore likely to be targeted by shareholder
value driven investors (Brav et al., 2008). We selected companies that are/were members of
either of these two indexes for at least two consecutive years from 2008 to 2013. We excluded
financial companies, such as banks and insurance companies, because their leverage ratio
and accounting practices are not comparable with non-financial companies (Atanassov and
Kim, 2009). We also excluded companies with a dual class of shares that, effectively, provide
(potential) equity owners with only non-voting shares. Subsidiaries of foreign companies listed
in London or Paris were also excluded. Our final sample is composed of 57 UK companies and
56 French firms. Company information was collected for the period 2008–2013 to assess the
impact of the great financial crisis on the undertaking of employee downsizing in different
institutional settings. The dependent variable (employee lay-offs) is operationalized as a
5 per cent or more reduction in the number of employees from the previous year (Ahmadjian
and Robbins, 2005; Munoz-Bullon and Sanchez-Bueno, 2014). This information was collected
from DATASTREAM (2015).
Our three independent variables are measured in the following manner. Drawing from
Atanassov and Kim (2009), we used total debts over total capital as a measurement of leverage.
The amount of debt carried by companies provides insights on the incentives of corporate
executives to secure concessions from employees. This information was also collected from
DATASTREAM (2015). Data on ownership structure and the presence of institutional investors
were collected as follows. First, data on French companies were collected from annual
company reports; from Dafsaliens (2008–2013), an annual publication on the ownership
structure of listed companies; and from the database of the French Financial Supervisory
Authority that publishes on a daily basis the arrival and exit of major shareholders exceeding
current disclosure requirements (3 per cent) in listed companies. Second, data on UK
companies were collected from annual reports and from the database of the Financial Times
(FT 500, 2015) that provides a full list of past and current shareholders exceeding the disclosure
requirements (3 per cent).
FINDINGS
We highlight the importance of two key QCA concepts before the presentation of our results:
consistency and coverage scores (Ragin, 2000). Consistency scoresmeasure the degree towhich
a combination of causal conditions generates the phenomenon of interest on the dependent
variable. That is, will the presence of a combination of conditions lead to the occurrence of
the dependent variable? Coverage scores, in contrast, measure the extent to which a causal
combination of conditions contributes to the occurrence of the outcome of interest on its
own. That is, how much of the occurrence of the dependent variable is generated by the
presence of the combination of conditions on the independent variable? High consistency
and coverage scores reflect the causal importance of independent variables for generating an
outcome (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012).
Our empirical results support our argument that the spread of employee downsizing to
France is indeed occurring but is also characterized by an extensive and highly specific process
of complex causation, whereas in the UK, the introduction of employee downsizing is more
easily implemented. First, employee downsizing is roughly equivalent in the two countries
despite the presence of institutional differences. Our sample is composed of 57 UK companies
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and 56 French firms. In the UK, 66 instances of substantial employee downsizing (5 per cent of
more in yearly reduction) took place from 2008 to 2013. The corresponding figure for France
was 57.
Second, high leverage is identified as a necessary condition in the undertaking of employee
downsizing in France with a consistency of 0.92, thus exceeding the advisable threshold of 0.90
for tests of necessity (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). The coverage value of 0.57 indicates
high relevance. In otherwords, large-scale lay-offs in France occur only in the restrictive context
of high leverage for the period under investigation. This is in sharp contrast to the UK and the
USwhere downsizing is often used as a tool to boost share price irrespective ofmacroeconomic
conditions (Farber and Hallock, 2009). This outcome suggests the importance of the
constraining institutional arrangements of employment protection in France and is consistent
with Proposition 1.
Third, the presence of three variables – high leverage, highly aggressive investors and
ownership diffusion – constitutes a sufficient path to trigger employee downsizing in
France. The consistency score for this combination of conditions is 0.78, which is above
the minimum threshold of 75 per cent prescribed by Schneider and Wagemann (2012)
for tests of sufficiency. In other words, in 78 per cent of the cases where this combination
of conditions was present, employee downsizing was high. This solution path also had a
coverage value of 0.40 that is in line with previous studies (Greckhamer, 2011; Korczynski
and Evans, 2013), meaning that 40 per cent of total instances of downsizing occurred
precisely because of this combination of conditions. In other words, the occurrence of
employee downsizing in France reflects the presence of a perfect storm of a combination
of conditions whereby the absence of any of these factors would remove the sufficient
character of this path to employee downsizing. This result is consistent with Propositions
1, 3, 4 and 6.
Fourth, the UK illustrates the presence of significantly less demanding conditions for
the implementation of employee downsizing. No necessary conditions were identified
for downsizing. With regard to sufficient pathways for downsizing, the most powerful
combination of conditions is ownership diffusion combined with the presence of highly
aggressive short-term oriented investors, with a consistency value of 0.75 and a
coverage value of 0.65. Empirical results for the UK are consistent with Propositions
2, 3 and 5. These outcomes suggest the greater ability of highly financialized investors
(hedge funds and private equity funds) to secure a favourable outcome in the presence
of ownership diffusion, that is, in the context whereby no shareholder owns a
controlling equity stake. In particular, hedge funds and private equity funds seek to
secure significant employee downsizing programmes even in the absence of high
leverage.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
An important theoretical contribution of this article is that the implementation of employee
downsizing schemes is appropriately explained by the integration of two theoretical
approaches: structurally based financialization and mid-range institutional perspectives.
Structurally oriented financialization approaches significantly contribute to our understanding
of employee downsizing by incorporating important developments in the global economy.
Financialization approaches have successfully developed a conceptualization of finance
beyond its traditional intermediary function. Financialization is not about the provision of
funding whether stock market finance (Engelen and Konings, 2010) or banks loans (Hardie
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et al., 2013) as reflected in the selection of our three financialized firm-level variables. Our focus
on listed companies illustrates that the rise of shareholder value driven financialized investors,
and the growing ownership diffusion of shares, do not bring addition funds to companies
because these transactions occurred in the form of secondary trading for already existing
securities (Kahan and Rock, 2007; Brav et al., 2008). Leverage, on the other hand, has become
more problematic in the context of the credit crunch whereby banks are more reluctant to roll
over existing debts and/or provide new loans (Hardie et al., 2013).
Instead, financialization approaches illustrate how the governance of companies is
increasingly more about the distribution of resources in society. The widespread, and roughly
equivalent use of large-scale lay-offs in France and the UK highlights the importance of
structural changes in the global economy despite the presence of institutional diversity. So
while institutional arrangements governing employee dismissals beyond liberal market
economies have formally remained stable (OECD, 2013), their influence over outcomes has
diminished, even in the institutionally constrained setting of France, as a result of how new
structural developments that influence strategic bargaining among different actors at firm
level. Yet, this new financial environment does not constitute a stable growth trajectory as
resources generated by large-scale lay-offs are not reinvested in the company in contrast to
institutionalized compromises under Fordism between managers and employees (Clark,
2011; Appelbaum and Batt, 2014).
In terms of mid-range institutional approaches, our investigation highlights the importance
of institutions in structuring the diffusion of new practices beyond liberal market economies
while also taking issue with a tendency in the literature that reify institutional frameworks.
Moving beyond a deterministic understanding of institutions, whereby outcomes are simply
‘read off’ from the constellation of prevailing institutional arrangements, we highlight two
novel contributions that illustrate how similar institutions can lead to different outcomeswhile,
at the same time, retaining the theoretical importance of institutional approaches as mid-range
theory. First, the causal influence of (individual) institutional arrangements is contingent upon
the specific characteristics of the complex causation settings in which they are embedded.
Similar institutions can lead to different outcomes because they can generate the outcome of
interest on the dependent variable as part of a specific intersection of necessary but not
sufficient conditions or via different but functionally equivalent paths (sufficient but not
necessary). For instance, private equity and hedge funds in the UK are able to secure employee
downsizing in the presence of ownership diffusion and, moreover, without needing high
leverage as a causal factor. In France, in contrast, employee downsizing occurs in the more
restrictive context of financialized investors, ownership diffusion and high leverage.
Our second contribution on mid-range institutional approaches illustrates how the use of
employee downsizing spreads across different settings via the presence of different types of
complex causation. Our argument builds upon a number of studies, especially in economic
sociology, that illustrate the importance of the local context (institutional bricolage, institutional
legitimacy) for the diffusion of practices beyond their original setting (Campbell, 2004). The
innovative aspect of our contribution to this debate suggests that different configurations of
institutional arrangements will require different types of complex causation for a common
outcome to occur across dissimilar business systems (Goyer, 2011: 106–128). That is, diversity
in institutional arrangements accounts for the uneven distribution of necessary/sufficient
conditions between cases. By comparing an institutionally constraining setting with a more
permissive one, our findings illustrate that more exhaustive sets of factors will be needed in
the former in order to generate a functionally equivalent outcome. For instance, the spread of
financialization to France, a non-liberal market economy, took place as a result of a confluence
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of two exhaustive factors: leverage as a necessary condition (Proposition 1) and the joint presence
of high leverage, financialized investors and ownership diffusion as a sufficient condition
(Propositions 1, 3, 4 and 6). In the UK, by contrast, the implementation of downsizing operates
independently of leverage (Proposition 2) and, moreover, the less exhaustive configuration of
short-term investors and ownership diffusion is sufficient to trigger employee downsizing
(Proposition 5).
The managerial implications of our study illustrate that while downsizing pressures
associated with financialization are likely to be present beyond liberal market economies, their
undertaking is contingent upon a confluence of two or more favourable factors. Managerial
strategies based on the use of large-scale lay-offs, such as a focus on core competencies and
post-acquisition restructuring, need to incorporate factors that are often part of the background
environment in liberal market economies. For instance, permissive institutional arrangements
for employee dismissals and the overall preponderance of patterns of ownership diffusion
constitute ‘constant’ variables that are not usually taken into account by managers in liberal
market economies in the implementation of employee lay-offs (Brav et al., 2008). It is clear,
however, that the extent and depth of these pressures measured across our three criteria is less
evident in France than convergence arguments focused on the global diffusion of shareholder
capitalism might suggest.
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Notes
1. A growing number of scholars are being drawn to Qualitative Comparative Analysis as a
methodology to capture processes of complex causation in diverse areas of employment relations
such as customer abuse in service sectors (Korczynski and Evans, 2013), job security regulations in
Europe (Emmenegger, 2011) and relative pay differences (Greckhamer, 2011).
2. The funding gap of banks is calculated as assets and loans/assets.
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